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Neuborne: First Amendment and Then Some

THE OCTOBER 2008 TERM:
FIRST AMENDMENT AND THEN SOME
Burt Neuborne*

I.

INTRODUCTION: OF SYLLOGISMS AND JUDICIAL POWER

Liberals must acknowledge a dirty little secret about American constitutional law; a secret that the Warren Court made apparent,
though it had existed from the day John Marshall asserted the power
of judicial review in a Constitution that says nothing about it.' The
secret is that there is no serious theory explaining or justifying what
courts actually do when they strike down a statute as unconstitutional.2 The Warren years were enormously important in moving the
country forward. I do not know what we would have done without
the wisdom and courage of the Court. But when you start looking for
jurisprudential theory to explain what it was that the Warren Court
was actually doing when it re-wrote most of American constitutional
law, and what it has been doing during the Rehnquist and Roberts
Court's attempted counter-reformation, when it re-wrote the rest, it is
clear that there is neither textual support in the Constitution, nor a
consensus political theory, that justifies much of judicial review.3
. Inez Milholland Professor of Civil Liberties, New York University School of Law; Founding Legal Director, Brennan Center for Justice, (1995-present); National Legal Director,
ACLU, (1981-86). This essay is based on an oral presentation given at the Practising Law
Institute's Eleventh Annual Supreme Court Review Program in New York City on August 4,
2009. I have edited the text to deal with the more incomprehensible portions of the transcript, but have attempted to preserve the talk's oral spirit-warts and all. The footnotes
have been added gratis by the Editors. I take neither credit, nor blame for them-although I
am grateful to the Editors for the effort to annotate my remarks.
1 Barry Friedman, The Importance ofBeing Positive: The Nature andFunction ofJudicial
Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 1257, 1263 (2004).
2 Id. at 1258.
3 See David W. Tyler, Clarifying Departmentalism:How the Framers' Vision ofJudicial
and PresidentialReview Makes the Case for Deductive Judicial Supremacy, 50 WM. &
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The official story that we tell ourselves sounds absurd to sophisticated lawyers. It was just retold in mind-numbing detail at Justice Sotomayor's confirmation hearings. The story we heard was that
Supreme Court Justices really do not have much power themselves;
they just apply the law made by someone else. 4 Under John Marshall's standard model, judging is described as the operation of a syllogism machine, in which the major premise is an external command
that comes from a democratic actor like the legislature, or the Founders.5 The minor premise is an objective, pre-existing set of facts
found by the Court; all the judge does in such a model is identify the
external legal command, put it together with the objective facts, and
reach a logically imposed conclusion-the judge is just a robotic operator of the syllogism machine. 6
Anybody who has anything to do with law or language understands that the so-called external democratic commands are almost
always ambiguous, sometimes terminally so, and that the so-called
external facts are often constructed by the court; indeed, there is a serious philosophical question about whether there was ever an objective reality to find. In fact, the construction of the legal major premise often comes from inside the judge, and the factual minor
premise is often a function of the perception of the judge or jury-not
some objective reality.
The official version of what judges do is, however, very different.7 Heaven help a judge who stands up and honestly says, "My
decision is not coming from outside me; it is coming from inside
MARY L. REv. 2215, 2230 (2009).
4 Thomas E. Baker, ConstitutionalTheory in a Nutshell, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 57,
66 (2004).
5 Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism, Realism,
and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 419, 421 (1992).
6 Id.

Pure formalists view the judicial system as if it were a giant syllogism
machine, with a determinate, externally-mandated legal rule supplying
the major premise, and objectively "true" pre-existing facts providing the
minor premise. The judge's job is to act as a highly skilled mechanic
with significant responsibility for identifying the "right" externallymandated rule, but with little legitimate discretion over the choice of the
rule.
Id.
7 See id. at 420 (stating-with regards to realism-that "[t]he value of her [the judge's]
work is measured, not by the rigor of the search for proper ingredients, but by the extent to
which the final product conforms to the tastes of the best customers.").
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me." Picture Justice Sotomayor telling such a story to the Senators.
Picture the Democratic Senators holding their heads. Picture the Republican Senators all shaking their heads because they live (or pretend to live) in a cartoon world in which there is no ambiguity, and
every text is an objectively knowable command. A world in which
every fact is objective and well-known, in their cartoon world, every
fact is objective and well-known and all a good judge has to do is
avoid allowing subjective prejudice to warp the objectively existing
commands that are coming from outside.
During the Sotomayor hearings, Democrats did not want to
question this fantasy because they did not want to raise any hard
questions. All they wanted to do was to run the clock out on the
hearings. Justice Sotomayor was delighted to play along with a series
of questions that essentially have fluff answers. 8 In fairness to her
repeated assertions that all she did as a lower court judge was to apply the law to facts found by the court, it may be that lower court
judges are more constrained than Supreme Court Justices-there may
be two institutionally different mechanisms here-, but Justice Sotomayor wisely did not want to get involved in that game. 9
What is so interesting about the 2008 Term is watching the
liberal Justices as they tried to conduct constitutional adjudicationin the absence of a theory that has some sort of consensus power to
it-in the teeth of conservative Justices who insist that anything that
goes beyond the syllogism machine is illegitimate judging. This is
why Justice Scalia is such a devoted textualist.o He claims that fidelity to literal (or originalist) text is the external command that authorizes a judge to act.11 It is also why Justice Thomas is such a literalist. 12 He will not act without a command from outside. 13 And it is
why the liberals are so confused and foggy in their opinion writing,
because they know they are not responding to an outside command.
8 Burt Neuborne, Judging is Both Robotic and Discretionary:Senators Missed an Opportunity to Ask how Sotomayor will Approach a Casefor Which Clear Guidance Does Not Exist, NAT'L. L.J., July 27, 2009, at 43.
' See id
10 Stephen Satterfield, A New Interpretation,An Absurd Result: How HHS is ShortChanging Childrenwith Severe Mental Illness, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1114, 1131 (2009).
" Neuborne, supra note 5, at 435.
12 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Problem of CanonicalAmbiguity in Mi v. Federal Bureau of
Prisons, 44 TULSA L. REv. 501, 504 (2009).
13 See id.
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They are breaking ties about ambiguous external commands that can
be plausibly read in at least two ways. But without a theory, such an
exercise of judicial discretion simply cannot be admitted.14 Since
they cannot admit to subjective decision-making, they have to pretend that they are responding to an external command from text or
history.
Consider District of Columbia v. Heller.'5 The conservative
majority went through an elaborate exercise in discovering the "true"
history of the Second Amendment. As though there was such a
"true" history to be discovered, and as though what people thought
about bore-loading muskets in the 18th century should govern what
we think about 9mm Magnums in the 21st century1 6
The liberal dissent followed suit. Their history was different,
leaving an originalist tie that had to be broken. The fact is that originalism in hard cases does not deliver any greater certainty about an
external command than any other theory of judging.
No one talked about the real issue: how the Second Amendment should be read in a 21st century world.
Sadly, these originalist jurisprudential charades are not novel.
In Boumediene v. Bush,'7 a different majority-written by Justice
Kennedy and supported the liberal Justices-went through a similar
originalists charade discussing which English pre-revolutionary practice dealing with habeas corpus in the fifty years prior to the American Revolution governed the modern availability of the writ. One
side pointed to the availability of habeas corpus for aliens confined
on the Isle of Man. The other stressed the unavailability of habeas
for aliens confined in Scotland1 8-as
if .18th century prerevolutionary British habeas corpus practice should tell us how to allocate habeas corpus to alleged enemy combatants detained by the
Executive in the 21st century.19 In any event, as with Heller, history
left us with a tie.
To counter the majority's originalist argument in Heller, the
14 See Alan Gura, Heller and the Triumph of OriginalistJudicial Engagement: A Response to Judge Harvie Wilkinson, 56 UCLA L. REv. 1127, 1134 (2009).
" 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
16 Id. at 2793, 2797, 2805.
" 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
18 Id. at 2249-51.
19

Id. at 2250-51.
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liberals had to engage in their own historical charade. 20 Why? Because they do not have any other explanation for where their power
comes from. Under the Marbury syllogism machine model, it had to
come from an external source, which was the historical external
source that Justice Scalia was pushing.2 1 Justice Stevens was forced
to say, "no," you have the wrong external source.2 2 Justice Scalia
was looking to the Scottish external source, and Justice Stevens was
looking to the Isle of Man external source. None of them would acknowledge that what was happening was a judicial risk allocation. In
Heller, measuring the risks of guns in urban settings against the risk
of government oppression if government can take the guns away. 23
In Boumediene, measuring the risk of releasing a potential terrorist
against the risk of uncontrolled Executive detention.
The 2008 Term was a triumph of conservative thinking about
Supreme Court decision-making.2 4 It is Justice Scalia's intellectual
triumph after years of insisting that you must consult the text. 25 The
text tells you what to do.26 If you go beyond the text, you must have
some very powerful reason and explanation.27 Often, it is history that
will let you go beyond the text.28 Sometimes, it is deference to
another institution that will let you go beyond the text, but you never

20

See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2838-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

21

id.

The Court's reliance on Article VII of the 1689 English Bill of Rightswhich, like most of the evidence offered by the Court today . .. is misguided both because Article V1l was enacted in response to different
concerns from those that motivated the Framers of the Second Amendment, and because the guarantees of the two provisions were by no
means coextensive.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
22 See Id. at 2836-38.
23 Pamela S. Karlan, Bullets, Ballots, and Battles on the Roberts Court,
35 OHIo N.U. L.
REv. 445, 452 (2009) ("[W]hether the Court admits it or not, the Justices care about consequences. They engage in interest balancing: the social costs of permitting weapons into
schools or government buildings-or onto airplanes or by minors or persons with criminal
records-outweigh respect for the individual right to keep and bear arms.").
24 Gura, supra note 14, at 1127-28.
25 Nancy S. McCahan, Justice Scalia's Constitutional Trinity: Originalism, Traditionalism and the Rule ofLaw as Reflected in His Dissent in O'Hare and Umbehr, 41 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 1435, 1436 (1997).
21 Id. at 1436-37.

27 See id. at 1438.
28 Id. at 1439.
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go beyond the external to go inside and consult your own values.29
The liberals are baffled.30 They know that such a description of the
reality of judging is wrong, both descriptively and normatively.'
They know that is too limited a vision, but there is no coherent alternative on the horizon. 32
To me, the most interesting thing during the 2008 Term was
the forty statutory construction cases.3 3 Over half the Term's cases
grappled with statutory text.34 Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
DistrictNumber One v. Holder 3 is so interesting because eight Justices finally appear to have come to a tentative agreement on the relationship between literalism, contextualism, structure, and democratic
purpose in dealing with text.3 6 Maybe the text wars are finally coming to an end.
That the issue of how to deal with text so dominates the Supreme Court's agenda is a triumph for Justice Scalia. While Justice
Souter's stubborn insistence on holistic, purposive interpretation of
text has significantly softened Scalia's initial formulations, the move
to text and the possible truce in Northwest Austin was Justice Scalia's
doing. When Justice Scalia joined the Supreme Court and began to
argue about text, he was laughed at.38 After a career on the Court,
Justice Scalia has everybody talking about text, even if they do not all
say the same thing. 39 The liberals start with text; the conservatives
start with text. All because, in the absence of a more sophisticated
See id. at 1464, 1468.
30 See Rachel Morris, Tipping Back the Scales: How Obama can Reverse Justice's Long
Slow Slide to the Right, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 1, 2009, at 37.
31 See Adam Winkler, Heller's Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1558 (2009).
32 See Morris,supra note 30, at 37.
29

33 SCOTUSBLOG, END OF TERM "SUPER STAT PACK" (2009), http://www.scotusblog.com

/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2009/06/full-stat-pack.pdf (analyzing the 2008 Term of the United
States Supreme Court, including all trends, statistics, and decisions of the Court).
34 Id.at 11, 13-27.
" 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
36 See id. at 2514-15, 2517.
3 See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 665, 684-85 (2009) ("[Originalism] raises profound questions both as to whether the original understanding can or
should give authoritative guidance and, if so, how exactly one should go about mining that
guidance.").
38 Roger Colinvaux, What is Law? A Searchfor Legal Meaning and Good Judging Under
a Textualist Lens, 72 IND. L.J. 1133, 1134-36 (1997).
3 See Gura, supra note 14, at 1130, 1147-48; John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 122 HARv. L. REv. 2003, 2014-15 (2009).
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theory of judicial review, we need an external command.4 0
There is a huge irony here. Every democracy since the
Second World War, even Great Britain, has put a serious judicial review component into its constitution or organic law. Great Britain
did it by treaty, giving its courts power to review legislation under the
European Human Rights Convention. 4 1 Even France, once the bastion of parliamentary supremacy, has a constitutionally established
Conseil Constitutionnel, which functions very much as a Supreme
Court.4 2 Virtually every democracy now has a constitutional court
that is designed, in some way, to adopt (or adapt) the 'American experience with judicial review,' which is thought to be our most important contribution to political science and democratic governance.4 3
Everywhere else, constitutional judges are considered protectors of individual rights and democracy, with the power to adapt the
constitutional text to modern circumstances." Ironically, the mother
ship-the United States Constitution-has no textual support for such
a role. There simply is no text in the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power of judicial review. 45 Lacking a textual foundation, American judges are at a loss about where their power comes
from.46 In the absence of a better theory, the easiest explanation is
John Marshall's syllogism machine.4 7 That is the Federalist Society's
intellectual position about what judges do.4 8 In contrast, there is very
little on the left that seeks to provide a coherent alternative to the syllogism machine.4 9 One can see the Court shifting, as the law almost
Gura, supra note 14, at 1134, 1148.
41 See Miguel Schor, Squaring the Circle: DemocratizingJudicialReview and the Counter-ConstitutionalDifficulty, 16 MINN. J. INT'L L. 61, 100-01 (2007); Justin S. Teff, The
Judges v. The State: ObtainingAdequate Judicial Compensation and New York's Current
Constitutional Crisis, 72 ALB. L. REv. 191, 214 (2009); Bernadette Meyler, Daniel Defoe
and the Written Constitution,94 CORNELL L. REv. 73, 73 n. 1 (2008).
42 See Burt Neuborne, Hommage A Louis Favoreu, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 17, 22 (2007).
43 See Schor, supra note 41, at 91, 100-01.
4 Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics ofDeath:Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759, 815
(1995).
45 Tyler, supra note 3, at 2230.
46 See Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, andReason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 601-02 (1985).
47 See Neuborne, supra note 5, at 420.
48 See Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook, On ConstitutionalChanges to Limit Government, 102
Nw. U. L. REv. 469, 471 (2008).
49 See Book Note, The Constitutionin Full Bloom, 104 HARv. L. REv. 645, 648-49 (1990).
40
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always does when one side has a set of powerful ideas, and there is
nothing but intuition on the other.
Of all the constitutional courts (and gin joints) in the world,
the only one that is afraid to interpret its constitutional text in a modem fashion is ours.50 What an incredible irony.
II.

FIRST AMENDMENT CASES

This was a very strange First Amendment term. Traditionally, there are almost always nine or ten First Amendment cases in a
term." During the 2008 Term, there were only five 52 and, of the five,
only one may be considered important.
While Citizens United v.
FEC, being heard on September 9, 2009, could become important,5 4
there has not been a terribly significant set of First Amendment decisions thus far in the 2008 Term. 5

5o See, e.g., Lindsay E. Lippman, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: The End of
JudicialElection Reform?, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 141 (2003) (arguing that
judicial appointment and nomination is derived from the political process and, therefore,
judges are reluctant to deviate from the directives of the party who elected them despite the
decision's fairness).
51 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the FirstAmendment: A PreliminaryExploitation of ConstitutionalSalience, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1765, 1792 n.139 (2004).
52 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129
S. Ct. 1800 (2009); Locke v. Karass, 129 S. Ct. 798 (2009); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009); Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 1093 (2009).
53 Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1805.
54 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009). Since the
decision was announced after this talk, I will spare you my fulminations over Citizens United, and what a mockery it makes of any theory of judicial neutrality to treat large for-profit
business corporations as creatures endowed with First Amendment rights.
5 See Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1948 (noting that the Court has long found "[w[here the
claim is invidious discrimination in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendment. . . the
plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose"); Fox
Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1805 (determining whether the Federal Communication Commission can adequately justify the prohibition of "indecent expletives even when the offensive
words are not repeated"); PleasantGrove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1129 (considering "whether the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment entitles a private group to insist that a municipality permit it to place a permanent monument in a city park in which other donated monuments were previously erected"); Ysursa, 129 S. Ct. at 1101 (holding that a State is not required to "affirmatively assist political speech by allowing public employees to administer
payroll deductions for political activities"); Locke, 129 S. Ct. at 801-03 (considering whether
a local union may charge nonmembers a fee that is paid to the union's national union organization without violating the First Amendment).
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FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.

The first case is FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., the
"fleeting expletive case." 56 The issue presented was whether the
Federal Communications Commission (the "FCC") has the power to
punish a broadcaster for the fleeting use of expletives when they are
covering a public event, and somebody at the public event unexpectedly uses an expletive.5 7 Here, the two expletives were "fuck" and
"shit."5 8 In one instance, Nicole Richie said, "Have you ever tried to
get cow shit out of a Prada purse?" 59 The other instance was Cher,
who said, "Fuck them."6 0 Both of these events occurred at Billboard
Music Award ceremonies. 61 Richie and Cher are show business figures who each used a single fleeting expletive.6 2 The issue is whether
the FCC could impose sanctions.6 3
Now, the important thing-from a First Amendment standpoint-is that the case said nothing about the First Amendment.64
The Supreme Court declined to reach the First Amendment issue. 65
The case turns solely on an administrative law issue.66
Over the years, the FCC had a rule saying that if fleeting expletives were broadcasted through no fault of the broadcaster, with no
follow-up, with no connivance, and with no wink and naughty nods,
there was no violation of any regulation.67 They just happened. In
fact, the regulation used to be called "the shit happens regulation."6 8
It seems that shit happened a little too often, so the FCC changed the
56 Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1809.

" Id. at 1805.
1 Id at 1808.
5 Id (noting that Richie also used the word "fuck" when she followed up the first utterance by saying, "It's not so fucking simple.").
60 Id.
61 Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1808 (noting that Cher's utterance was in 2002 and Richie's was in 2003).

62 Id. (noting that Cher is a singer and that Nicole Richie appeared on television series).
63 Id. at 1805.
6 Id. at 1811.
65 Id. at 1819 ("We see no reason to abandon our usual procedures in a rush to judgment
without a lower court opinion. We decline to address the constitutional questions at this
time.").
6 Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1819 (Thomas, J., concurring).
67 Id at 1807 (majority opinion).
68 See id. at 1827 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that an occasional mishap is to be distinguished from a patent attempt at vulgarity).
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rule.
The FCC was reacting, obviously, to a strong political constituency, which is one of the dangers of federal regulation.70 Political
capture can happen to any administrative agency. In this case, political capture happened to the FCC, and, as a result, it responded to a
very strong groundswell from the Republican base about coarse language.71 As a result, the FCC changed its rule and made both Richie's and Cher's use of coarse language violations of the Act. 72 After a derisory process, the FCC announced that it would prosecute
and punish fleeting expletives.
The FCC prosecuted Fox Television ("Fox"), the network that
aired the Billboard Music Awards, under the Act.74 The FCC found
Fox guilty, but imposed no sanctions. Nevertheless, Fox appealed
from the FCC finding.75 After all, a violation of the Act on a broadcaster's record is not a good thing, because if it happens again, there
can be serious consequences. 76 The bulk of the Supreme Court's reasoning-the bulk of the writing-is about whether deference should
be given to the FCC's judgment in this situation, as a matter of administrative law, in the absence of some special reason for having

69 Id. at 1834 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

The FCC thus repeatedly made clear that it based its "fleeting expletive"
policy upon the need to avoid treading too close to the constitutional line
.... What then did it say, when it changed its policy, about why it abandoned this Constitution-based reasoning? The FCC devoted 'four full
. ,responding to industry arpages of small-type, single-spaced text,' ..
guments that ... changes in the nature of the broadcast industry made all
indecency regulation, .
unconstitutional.
Id.
7 Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1815-16 (majority opinion) ("Indeed, the precise policy
change at issue here was spurred by significant political pressure from Congress.").
n See Keith Brown & Adam Candeub, The Law and Economics of Wardrobe Malfunction, 2005 BYU L. REv. 1463, 1464-65, 1488 (2005) (asserting that a great majority of complaints were sent by "a conservative political group with connections to the Republican Party").
72 Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1807, 1809.
73 Id. at 1808 ("On March 15, 2006, the [FCC] released Notices of Apparent Liability for
a number of broadcasts that the Commission deemed actionably indecent, including the two
described above.").
74 id.
7s Id. at 1809-10.
76 Id. at 1836 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("The result is that smaller stations, fearing 'fleeting expletive' fines of up to $325,000, may simply cut back on their coverage.").
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changed the rules.
The Second Circuit essentially imposed an administrative law
rule saying that in the First Amendment context, when an agency
changes its mind and makes punishable speech that had not been previously punishable, it requires some serious explanation of why it is
being done. 78 If it does not provide a serious explanation, it is a violation of administrative law. 79 This reasoning is akin to a canon of
constitutional avoidance in the context of administrative law making,
one which, however, the Supreme Court rejected.so
Justice Scalia rejected this reasoning for a five-person majority. He said that the FCC is an administrative agency, and it gets to
change its mind without having to explain itself.82 If the agency
changes its mind and decides that something should be sanctioned,
and if nobody challenges its statutory authorization, then the statutory
authorization gives it the capacity to shift policy back and forth, even
when it has First Amendment implications with relatively thin explanations.83
The FCC did give some explanation, and it did go through
some semblance of decision-making, which the Court found to be

"

Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1810-11 (majority opinion).

78 Id. at 1810.

In overturning the Commission's judgment, the Court of Appeals here
relied in part on Circuit precedent requiring a more substantial explanation for agency action that changes prior policy. . . . We find no basis in
the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a requirement
that all agency change be subjected to more searching review.
Id.
" Id. at 1810.
8 Id. at 1811 ("The so-called canon of constitutional avoidance is an interpretive tool,
counseling that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious constitutional
doubts.").
8 Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1811-12.
82Id. at 1811.
[An agency] need not demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are
good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the
conscious change of course adequately indicates. This means that the
agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than what
would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate.
Id.
8

Id. at 1819.
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enough.84 The dissent wanted to establish a more intense set of
norms that an administrative agency had to follow before it could
change its rules.85
Although the Court refrained from touching the First
Amendment,8 6 the First Amendment issue will probably come back
to the Court on remand, so the issue is not over.87 Interestingly
enough, Justice Kennedy went with the majority-Justice Scalia.8 1 If
Justice Kennedy is still on the Court when it comes back up, he will
likely have a strong opinion, since he has never seen a First Amendment issue that he did not think was important. 89 It is an open question whether Justice Kennedy will sustain this as a First Amendment
matter, even though he was prepared to sustain it as an administrative
law matter. 90

84

Id. at 1818-19.

85 Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1830-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

To explain a change requires more than setting forth reasons why the
new policy is a good one. It also requires the agency to answer the question, 'Why did you change?' And a rational answer to this question typically requires a more complete explanation than would prove satisfactory were change itself not at issue. An (imaginary) administrator
explaining why he chose a policy that requires driving on the right-side,
rather than the left-side, of the road might say, 'Well, one side seemed as
good as the other, so I flipped a coin.' But even assuming the rationality
of that explanation for an initial choice, that explanation is not at all rational if offered to explain why the administrator changed driving practice, from right-side to left-side, 25 years later.
Id at 1830-31.
86 Id. at 1819 (majority opinion) (commenting on the dissents' positions).
87id

88 Id. at 1822 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
89 See Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2002 Term, 31
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 499, 517 (2004) ("Typically, Justice Kennedy tops the chart in First
Amendment cases, voting most often in favor of First Amendment claims.").
90 Fox Television, 129 S. Ct at 1824 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Where there is a policy change the record may be much more developed
because the agency based its prior policy on factual findings. In that instance, an agency's decision to change course may be arbitrary and capricious if the agency ignores or countermands its earlier factual findings
without reasoned explanation for doing so. An agency cannot simply
disregard contrary or inconvenient factual determinations that it made in
the past, any more than it can ignore inconvenient facts when it writes on
a blank slate.
Id.
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Pleasant Grove City v. Summum

The second case of importance this Term was PleasantGrove
City v. Summum. This case involved a fringe religious group that insisted that a town put a permanent monument to its religion in a public park because there were other such monuments in the park." The
town had several permanent monuments, one of which was a Ten
Commandments monument. 92 Summum said, given all these other
monuments, we have an equal right to have our monument in the
park.93 The Supreme Court said "no," holding that the religious
group was confusing two issues.9 4 When the government acts as a
regulator and creates a public forum for private speech, it cannot pick
and choose what private speech to allow-it has to be equal. 95 Likewise, if permits are being given out to speak on a Friday night, or if
the park is being set up for what is essentially a place for First
Amendment speech-a public forum-the government cannot discriminate on the basis of content. 96 But, held the Court, when the
government erects permanent monuments on its own property, even
when the monuments are privately funded, the government is not
running a public forum-the government, itself, is speaking.9 7
The government is engaged in what the Court calls "government speech." 98 The Court noted that since the government speaks
all the time about supporting its policies, 99 putting a permanent monument in the park is just another example of the government speaking in favor of its policies. Thus, held the Court, the public forum
doctrine does not apply. 00
Not only does the public forum doctrine not apply, but the
Court held that government speech is not really First Amendment ac91 PleasantGrove, 129 S. Ct. at 1129.
92 Id.

9 Id. at 1130.
94 Id. at 1131.
95 See id. at 1132 ("[A]ny restriction based on the content of the speech must satisfy strict
scrutiny, that is, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest . . . .").
96 PleasantGrove, 129 S. Ct. at 1132.
97 Id.
9 Id. at 1133.
9 Id. at 1141 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)).
10 Id. at 1131-32, 1134 (majority opinion).
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tivity.o'
The Court did not define exactly what legal category monument-building fell into, but noted it was an exercise of the government power, which is regulated, not by the Free Speech Clause, but
by other provisions of the Constitution-the most important being the
Establishment Clause.102 Justice Alito, writing for the majority, did
not put any other checking norm into his opinion, just the Establishment Clause.10 3 Some of the other concurring Justices stated that
there must be additional checking legal norms because it would be
dangerous to allow the government to speak with essentially no restrictions. 10 4 The concurring Justices speculated that there must be
some equality check, maybe a due process check as well.105
What comes out of Pleasant Grove is a new legal categorygovernment speech. 106 I think the new category is trivial, and not
likely to go anywhere. However, some people think it is dangerous. 107 Hypothetically, suppose some town decides it is going to
have a monument in its park to honor great Democrats of the pastthe Jefferson/Jackson monument. The Jefferson/Jackson monument
is established, and the statue states that the Democratic Party is the
best party. Now, the town Republicans say, "We would like a monument of the great Republicans of the past, as well." The town
council says, "Sure, if you can find one, the town will put up a great
Republicans monument. But we do not think there are any great Republicans, so no monument for you." In such a setting, I am confi-

101Pleasant Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 ("If petitioners were engaging in their own expressive conduct, then the Free Speech Clause has no application. The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.").
102 Id. at 1131-32.
103 Id. at 1132.
104 Id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring).
1os Id.
For even if the Free Speech Clause neither restricts nor protects government speech, government speakers are bound by the Constitution's other
proscriptions, including those supplied.by the Establishment and Equal
Protection Clauses. Together with the checks imposed by our democratic processes, these constitutional safeguards ensure that the effect of today's decision will be limited.
PleasantGrove, 129 S. Ct. at 1139.
106 Id. at 1141-42 (Souter, J., concurring) ("After today's decision, whenever a government maintains a monument it will presumably be understood to be engaging in government
speech.").
107 Christopher C. Lund, Keeping The Government's Religion Pure: Pleasant Grove City
v. Summum, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 46, 51-52 (2009).
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dent that equality and the First Amendment cannot be avoided just by
labeling the Democratic Party monument government speech. There
will probably be more litigation over this. But, in my opinion, the
fear that it will somehow morph into a dangerous doctrine is small.
Where is the government speech doctrine announced in Summum likely to take us? What happens when there are a hundred
groups saying they want their monument in the park? Under one
reading of the case, the city can pick and choose whatever monuments it wants. If the park is publicly-owned land, and the government is setting aside such land for the use of a monument, the government is essentially blending both the city and the private person
who built the monument into government speech.' 0 8
Before Summum, I would have said that adopting a private
person's speech is probably not a sufficient governmental commitment to turn it into government speech. However, in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association,'09 where the government was paying
for "beef-related projects, including promotional campaigns" through
a series of compelled "assessment[s] on cattle sales and importation,"" 0 the Court treated it as a form of taxpayer-supported government speech. In Rust v. Sullivan,"' the case where the government
speech issue first arose, government-subsidized doctors were treated
by the Court as delivering a message about birth control and abortion.
They were said to be government speakers. 1' 2
108
109

PleasantGrove, 129 S. Ct. at 1134.
544 U.S. 550 (2005).

"o Id. at 553-54.
." 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
112

Id. at 200.
We need not resolve that question here, however, because the Title X
program regulations do not significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient
relationship. Nothing in them requires a doctor to represent as his own
any opinion that he does not in fact hold. Nor is the doctor-patient relationship established by the Title X program sufficiently all encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the part of the patient of comprehensive medical advice. The program does not provide post conception
medical care, and therefore a doctor's silence with regard to abortion
cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the
doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate option for her. The
doctor is always free to make clear that advice regarding abortion is
simply beyond the scope of the program. In these circumstances, the
general rule that the Government may choose not to subsidize speech
applies with full force.
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In each case, there was a significant commitment of governmental resources to the dissemination of a government-selected message by a private speaker.' 13 The Court has not yet evolved a test to
distinguish between merely assisting a private speaker, and subsuming a private speaker's message into government speech.1 14 The reasonable patient sitting in the room with the doctor in Rust did not
think she was talking to a government official; she thought she was
talking to her doctor."' The challengers in Johanns thought they
were dealing with a government-compelled subsidy of private
speech.
The issue in Rust was whether the government could forbid
the doctor from talking about abortion with her. 16 The Supreme
Court said yes, because the doctor is a government speaker delivering
a pre-set government message.1 17 Legal Services Corporationv. Velazquez, can be distinguished in that although legal services lawyers are paid by the government, the government is not paying for
them to deliver a government message.11 9 The government is paying
for the lawyer to be the spokesperson for their clients; therefore, the
government cannot regulate what the legal services lawyer could say,
even if it can regulate a doctor.120
The real battle in the future is how to tell when the government has co-opted private speech as its own, and when it is just facilitating the speech of someone else.
C.

Ysura v. Pocatello Education Ass'n &
Locke v. Karass

Two other important cases are Ysura v. Pocatello Education
Ass'n. and Locke v. Karass. Both cases deal with the long-running
Id.
113 See Brief of Petitioners at 2, Rust, 500 U.S. 173 (No. 89-1391) [hereinafter Brief of
Petitioners].
114See Rust, 500 U.S. at 183 (demonstrating that the Court was primarily concerned with
whether, facially, the regulations were authorized by the Public Health Service Act).
115 See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 113, at 21-23.
116 Rust, 500 U.S. at 177-80.
"

See id. at 192-93.

Its

531 U.S. 533 (2001).

"9 Id. at 542.

120Id. at 548 ("The Constitution does not permit the Government to confine litigants and
their attorneys in this manner.").
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fight between labor and management on check-offs on behalf of public employees.121 Ysura holds that a state can ban public employee
check-offs for political activities even when the local government
wants to do it.122 The Ysura Court recognized that private employers
cannot be banned from agreeing to check-offs.123 If a private employer and the union have a deal where there was a check-off for political activity, the government cannot object to that1 24 because such
an objection would be a violation of the First Amendment.125 But,
noted the Ysura Court, government can restrict check-offs if the government is the employer.126 Ysura was a mixed case where a local
governmental employer was willing to administer a check-off, but
where state law banned the practice.
The Supreme Court upheld that state ban,127 holding that the
decision to permit a check-off is essentially a decision about whether
or not to allow a subsidy.12 8 As long as it is a government entity that
is being targeted, the government can decide not to allow the subsi-

dy.129
While Justice Souter, in his last dissent on the Court, argued
that the state ban was viewpoint based, and should be declared unconstitutional because it was aimed at labor unions being able to engage in political activity,13 0 the Court held that the government could
prohibit the check off.131
The other check-off case, Locke, ended a long-running battle
about whether a national union could require a local to charge local
members a fee that is not only designed to subsidize bargaining at the

Ysura, 129 S. Ct. at 1096; Locke, 129 S. Ct. at 802.
Ysura, 129 S. Ct. at 1096 ("Idaho's law does not restrict political speech, but rather
declines to promote that speech by allowing public employee check-offs for political activities. Such a decision is reasonable in light of the State's interest in avoiding the appearance
that carrying out the public's business is tainted by partisan political activity.").
123 Id. at 1097.
124 Id. at 1107 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 1101 (majority opinion).
126 id.
127 Ysura, 129 S. Ct. at 1100-01.
128 Id. at 1101.
121
122

129 Id.
130 Id. at

1105 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Because it is clear to me that the restriction was
intended to make it more difficult for unions to finance political speech, I would hold it unconstitutional in all its applications.").
131 Id. at 1096 (majority opinion).
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local level, but is also designed to support national litigation. 132 The
Supreme Court said yes, 33 resolving a bitterly disputed issue in labor
law. 134 The Supreme Court held that as long as the national litigation
is in some way connected with the ability to do collective bargaining
at the local level, and as long as all of the locals pay for it, not just
one particular local, the affiliation fee is lawful. 35
D.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission' 36

The last case, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, is the case that is still yet to come, and it is the crucial case. Citizens United is a challenge to the provisions of the McCain-Feingold
Act that ban corporate-funded electioneering communications very
close to an election.1 37 With respect to the statutory provisions, there
are three blackout periods: the general election has a sixty-day ban;
the convention has a thirty-day ban; and the primaries have a thirtyday ban.' 3 8
If a communication essentially says to vote for or against a
candidate, is funded in whole or in part with corporate treasury funds,
and is targeted to the relevant electorate, it becomes an electioneering
communication and cannot be disseminated through the electronic
media during the blackout period.13 9 The Act states that the corporation has to use other means of dissemination.140 The electioneering

132

Locke, 129 S. Ct. at 802.

Id at 807.
134 See id. at 803-04.

' Id. at 802 ("[T]he litigation charge is reciprocal in nature, i.e., the contributing local
reasonably expects other locals to contribute similarly to the national's resources used for
costs of similar litigation on behalf of the contributing local if and when it takes place.").
136 Recall that these remarks were made on August 4, 2009.
13 Citizens United, 129 S. Ct. at 2893.
'n
2 U.S.C.A. § 434 (West 2009). The statute states in relevant part:
(II) is made within(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office
sought by the candidate; or
(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or
caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for
the office sought by the candidate ....
Id. § 434(f(3)(A)(i)(II)(aa) & (bb).
131 Id. § 434(0(3).
140

id.
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communication has to be electronic; it has to be on the radio or television. 14 1 The ban does not cover the Internet, nor does it cover

books.14 2
When the case was argued in the Supreme Court for the first
time, the Deputy Solicitor General, was pushed into a position of saying that, theoretically, the government was asserting the power to
cover books as well. 143 In other words, Congress could outlaw books
funded by corporations during the blackout periods. 14 4 When the assertion was made, shock came over the faces of the Justices, because
that is an enormously broad assertion of governmental authority.1 45
Everyone was waiting for a decision.14 6 Instead of a decision, there
was an order from Chief Justice Roberts and the Court on June 29,
2009, asking that two issues be argued. First, should Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,147 the case that upheld the constitutionality of bans on independent expenditures by corporate treasuries, be
§ 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (" 'electioneering communication' means any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication . . . ."); but see 2 U.S.C.A. §431(22) (West 2009) ("The term
141

See id.

'public communication' means a communication by means of any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general public, or any other form of general public political advertising.").
142 See 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 434(f)(3)(A)(i), 431(22) (demonstrating that neither definition provides to cover books or the internet).
143 Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Citizens United, 129 S. Ct. 594 (No. 08-205). The
transcript reads in relevant part:
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Just to make it clear, it's the government's position that under the statute, if this kindle device where you can read a
book which is campaign advocacy, within the 60-30 day period, if it
comes from a satellite, it's under-it can be prohibited under the Constitution and perhaps under this statute?
MR. STEWART: It-it can't be prohibited, but a corporation could be
barred from using its general treasury finds to publish the book and
could be required to use-to raise funds to publish the book using its
PAC.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: If it has one name, one use of the candidate's name, it would be covered, correct?
MR. STEWART: That's correct.
Id.
Id. at 29, 35-36.
Id. at 36-38.
146 See Robert G. Kaiser, Will Deep Pockets Always Win? It's in Roberts' Court, WASH.
POST, Sept. 5, 2009, at Bus. Sec. 1.
147 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
'"

145
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reconsidered?l 48 Second, should McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission,149 which is a 2003 case that declined to declare the
McCain-Feingold law facially unconstitutional, be reconsidered?15 0
The order asked for briefing of those two issues.15'
The whole area of corporate campaigning and the existence of
the McCain-Feingold statute are now up for reconsideration. In sum,
there could be a decision by October or November that will strike
away the entire campaign finance structure on First Amendment

grounds. 152
It is not likely to happen for two reasons. First, there is a perfectly good as-applied argument for its protection.' 5 3 The communication in question is a 90 minute movie put out by a grass roots advocacy organization that raised 99% of the money from individuals and
less than 1% from corporations;154 as such, there is only a trace
amount of corporate funds in the first place.
Second, there are two very important statutory restrictions. 5 5
The first statutory restriction says it has to be "targeted to the relevant
electorate." 5 6 The election trigger is the Democratic primary. 5 The
distribution mechanism is a video-on-demand, where the viewer has
to go onto her cable's on-demand channel and click on to this particular movie to download it onto her personal cable box. 8
The question is whether this can be considered targeted to the
relevant electorate.159 How many voters in a Democratic primary are
going to assert the energy to find the movie, click on it, and download it for a ninety-minute hatchet job on one of the most popular

148 See id. at 654-55 (summarizing the reasoning and holding of the Austin Court).

540 U.S. 93 (2003).
1so Id. (finding that as-applied challenges to the bill remain available, but declining to
strike the bill down on its face).
"' Citizens United, 129 S. Ct. at 2893.
152 See Adam Liptak, Justices to Revisit 'Hillary' Film, and Corporate Cash in
Politics,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2009, at Al.
1
See Brief of Appellant at 32-33, Citizens United, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009) (No. 08-205)
[hereinafter Brief of Appellant].
154 id.
"' See 2 U.S.C.A. § 434.
156 Id. §434(f)(3)(A)(i)(III).
157 See Aaron Harmon, Hillary: The Movie: CorporateFreeSpeech or Campaign
Finance
Corruption?,4 DUKE J. CONST. L. PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 331, 332 (2009).
158 Brief of Appellant, supra note 153, at 25-26.
149

59 See id. at 12.
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people in the party-Hillary Clinton. Since the definition of "targeted to a relevant electorate" is that it must be heard by 50,000 persons,160 it must be assumed that 50,000 people who are eligible to
vote in a state Democratic primary are going to download this movie.
Moreover, even if the minimum number is met, the Court
should hold that there is an implicit de minimis exception where there
is just a trace amount of corporate funding that would trigger the statute. A second statutory restriction calls into question whether this
communication should fall within the statute at all.1 61 Here, "less
than 1% [of Citizens United's funding] was donated by for-profit

corporations."

62

If the communication does fall within the statute, then it is
clearly outside the scope of what Austin was about.163 Austin involved a Chamber of Commerce communication on the eve of a local
election. The Chamber of Commerce was 75% funded by corporate
treasury funds, and the communication clearly articulated a message
for or against the candidate in the local election.164 The Austin
Court's was concerned about spending vast amounts of corporate
treasury funds, which had been amassed through economic transactions, having nothing to do with politics, on the eve of an election in a
way that would distort the democratic process.1 65
Austin 's reasoning does not apply to an organization that is
made up almost exclusively of individuals, and where less than 1%of
the money comes from corporations; especially, where the distribution mechanism is volitional-the communication is on cable televi160 2 U.S.C.A. § 434.
161 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 153, at 32.
162 Id. at 33 (citation omitted) ("Twenty-five persons gave more than
$1,000 to Citizens
United for that purpose .... Of the more than $200,000 raised from these large donors, only
$2,000-less than 1%--was donated by for-profit corporations.").

163 See id. at 31-32.

'6 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 656.
16s See id. at 659-60.

[The] regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the political
arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that
have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's
political ideas .... The Act does not attempt "to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections . . ; rather, it ensures that expenditures
reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by corporations.
Id.
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sion, but you have to push a button to view the program.166 Such a
communication is just like taking a book out of a library. That is why
oral argument questioning went to books, because if this is covered,
then books can be covered, even though you have to have a volitional
decision to open it and read it.167 Thus, it seems clear that there is an
as-applied First Amendment issue here. The Supreme Court should
say that this communication is not covered by the statute, and is not a
violation of Austin. 16 8
The liberals are hoping the Court will do what it did in
Northwest Austin: no statutory coverage exists here, and therefore,
there is no need to look at any constitutional issues. 169 Chief Justice
Roberts is an extraordinarily conservative man, and a very strong
conservative justice.1 70 He is seriously committed to the enterprise of
judging, and appears to be committed to the enterprise of the Supreme Court. He is not likely to be so quick to jump and overturn recent Supreme Court precedent in a case in which there is an alternative way to protect the First Amendment interests. If he does so in
Citizens United, the case will be a signal of things to come. If Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are prepared to overrule past constitutional precedent in a facial review of the case, instead of as-applied
review,17 1 even though there are clear non-constitutional and asapplied ways of protecting the First Amendment rights,172 then an extraordinary judicial earthquake should be expected. It will not just
destabilize campaign finance, but it means that Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito do not mean what they say when they talk about
their commitment to limited judging.17 3 If they are prepared to over166 Brief of Appellant, supra note 153, at 25, 33.
167 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 143, at 28.
168 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 153, at 32-33. "The individual donors who pro-

vided virtually all of the funding for Citizens United's documentary knew that they were
supporting the documentary and donated precisely for that reason . . . . [Therefore,] [i]t is

inconceivable that these donations gave Citizens United any 'unfair advantage in the political marketplace.' " Id. at 33-34 (citation omitted).
169

Boy was I wrong!

170 See David E. Rosenbaum, Jr., An Advocate for the Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2005, at
Al6 ("[S]ometimes[] he took positions even more conservative than those of his prominent
superiors.").
171 Richard H. Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-PartyStanding, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1368 (2000) (explaining that the Court's traditional way of approaching these cases is the as-applied method).
172 id

17 See Kenneth W. Starr, The Roberts Court at Age Three: A Response, 54 WAYNE L.
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turn precedent in Citizens United, they are likely going to do it elsewhere, which means that we are going to see real stare decisis erosion in the years to come.
Finally, in thinking about the issues raised in Citizens United,
it is important to look at the Law of Democracy, as well as the First
Amendment. It is unfortunate that the Law of Democracy in the
United States is the accidental intersection of the series of doctrinal
legal questions where no one asks whether the outcome would be a
good thing for democracy. This point is reflected in Ysura, the employment case that I discussed earlier. 7 4 Judges look at whether the
First Amendment requires it, whether the Equal Protection Clause requires it, whether the Fifteenth Amendment requires it, whether the
Thirteenth Amendment requires it, and whether the Voting Rights
Act requires it. However, nobody takes a step back and asks if we
are helping or hurting the functioning of democracy. I believe that
the Law of Democracy should be seen as a more robust, freestanding
concept, rather than as the accidental confluence of unconnected doctrines.
That observation makes one of the cases that has not been
discussed-Bartlettv. Strickland"'-one of the most important cases
of the Term.
The Court in Bartlett, in a 3-2-4 decision, held that the vote
dilution provisions of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not require the creation or preservation of "crossover districts," where a
minority bloc with slightly less than 50% of the electorate could join
with other groups in a coalition.176 Section 2 requires that when there
is a minority-majority district-when there is a majority of black voters in a particular area-the voting lines must be drawn to allow them
"to elect the[] candidate[s] of their choice."1 77 Attacking a majorityminority district is a classic vote-dilution case.17 8 The Supreme Court
refused to apply vote dilution several years ago to something called
an "influence district," where there was a pocket of 15% - 20% of
black voters who would have the ability to throw their weight around
REV. 1015, 1021 (2008) ("[T]he Alito-Roberts partnership has proven potent .....
174See Ysura, 129 S. Ct. at 1107.
175 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009).

176 See Id. at 1248-49 ("Our holding that

§ 2 does not require crossover districts does not
consider the permissibility of such districts as a matter of legislative choice or discretion.").
177 Id. at 1242.
178 See Id. at 1239.
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and, therefore, become much more politically viable.179 The Court
said no, this is not covered by the Voting Rights Act.180
Bartlett was an intermediate case dealing with a district of approximately 40% black voters. 8 1 The question was what to do when
a 40% black district exists, where you can statistically predict that
there will be a sufficient number of white crossover voters so that the
black voters will dominate the election. Does section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act require an effort to achieve such a result? 82 Three members of the Court said no as a matter of statutory construction. 183 Two
members of the Court said no, because preventing racial vote dilution
is wrong from the very beginning; there should not be any vote dilution claim, even in majority-minority settings. 184 Four members of
the Court said that "crossover districts" were covered by section 2,
because failing to create such possibilities for black voters is exactly
what the vote dilution is about.185
After Bartlett, we now have a perfect Republican storm. Republicans now can take section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and pack
over 50% black districts with an excess of black, reliably Democratic
voters. They can "use up" these excess black Democratic votes in
majority-minority districts. These districts are often gerrymandered
by Republican state legislators, who are delighted to do so because
"packing" black Democratic voters into a majority-minority district
increases the probability of having Republicans elected in the surrounding districts. Without thinking about the impact on democracy
generally, or about the general purpose of helping racial minorities to
recover from two centuries of oppression, the Supreme Court has
now held that there is no obligation to maximize black voting power
in connection with the "influence districts," and no obligation to do it
179 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 445-46 (2006).
180 Id
18

Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1239.

182 Id. at 1238.
183 Id. at 1248 ("When we address the mandate of § 2, however, we must note it is not
concerned with maximizing minority voting strength, . . . ; and, as a statutory matter, § 2
does not mandate creating or preserving crossover districts.").
184 See id. at 1250 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The text of § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act of
1965 does not authorize any vote dilution claim, regardless of the size of the minority population in a given district.") (citation omitted).
181 See id. at 1253 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("And a functional analysis leaves no doubt that
crossover districts vindicate the interest expressly protected by § 2: the opportunity to elect a
desired representative.").
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in "crossover districts."18 6 The result is exactly what a Republican
strategist would want: pack Democrats into black districts, and then
draw the other districts in a way that will minimize the overall black
vote. I fear that Bartlett, will have a lasting impact on the 2010 reap87

1
portionent.

See you next year.

See Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1248-49.
See Press Release, American Legislative Exchange Council, Supreme Court's Ruling
Upholds Integrity of State Legislators' Redistricting Authority (Mar. 16, 2009).
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